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Pre-Service Removal in the Forum Defendant's Arsenal
Saurabh Vishnubhakat*
ABSTRACT

This article is the first academic defense of pre-service removal in diversity cases
by forum-state defendants under the "properly joined and served" language of 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b). Pre-service removal has proliferated nationally in recent years.
Appellate courts, however, have been silent on the issue for two reasons: First, orders
that remand a case to state court are statutorily non-reviewable on appeal. Second,
cases retained in federal court and litigated to final judgment are highly unlikely, for
reasons of judicial economy, to be voided for de novo readjudication in state court.
After tracing the development of the removal statute and the historical concern of
local prejudice, the article evaluates competing approaches of pre-service removal
from U.S. District Court case law. The article concludes with a discussion of the
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, currently being
considered by Congress, and the changes it offers for removal jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION

The forum-state exception prohibits removal of diversity actions from state to
federal court if even one "properly joined and served" defendant is a citizen of the
forum state.' Forum defendants, however, have tried to circumvent the rule by
removing lawsuits prior to being served, and recent U.S. District Court decisions are
split on the legitimacy of this tactic. The U.S. Courts of Appeals have been silent on
the issue for two reasons. First, an order remanding a case to state court is statutorily
non-reviewable on appeal. Second, for those cases tried in federal court and
subsequently appealed, judicial economy counsels against the reviewing court's
voiding of an entire federal proceeding only to remand it for readjudication in state
court. This Article examines representative U.S. District Court case law on the issue
of pre-service removal and argues for the legitimacy of pre-service removal.
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT THE FORMULATION OF MODERN REMOVAL LAW
A. A HistoricalOverview ofRemovability

The jurisprudence of removal of cases from state to federal court has long looked
to concerns of local prejudice where the parties are citizens of different states.2 Rules
of federal procedure addressed these historical concerns as recently as 1911, nearly a
half century after the sectionalism of the Civil War. Indeed, the Judicial Code of 1911
provided separately for removal based on local prejudice, 3 having provided elsewhere
for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. This appreciation for the risk of
prejudice remains today, serving as a premise for proposals for procedural reform
rather than a matter of fundamental debate.5
The modem history of amendments to the removal statute implicates the concern
with local prejudice in a number of ways. The first of these amendments came with

1.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).

2.

See, e.g., W.S. SimKINs, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND THE JURISDICTION OF ALL

FEDERAL COURTS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY INCLUDING REMOVAL OF CAUSES 157-58 (rev. ed.

1923) (explaining that when local prejudice is a factor in diversity cases, the defendant may
remove the case to federal court).
See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified as
3.
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (providing a right of removal specifically on the
grounds of local prejudice).
4.
See id. § 28, 36 Stat. at 1094 (providing a separate right of removal on the
grounds of diversity of citizenship).
5.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
291-92 (1996) (proposing the diminution of diversity jurisdiction to those "classes of cases
in which there is some basis for fearing that state courts might be prejudiced against
nonresidents"). Implicit in Judge Posner's position, of course, is the legitimate concern that
local prejudice against non-resident litigants will sometimes be an issue. See id.
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the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.6 Among other things, the 1976
amendment provided that a civil action brought in state court "against a foreign
state ... may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 7 In
thus creating a new category of removal jurisdiction, Congress also provided that "the
time limitations of [effecting removal]8 may be enlapged at any time for cause
shown," but not diminished.9
The next amendment to the removal statute was the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1985. This Act was not substantive legislation with merely an incidental effect on
removal, but was itself a procedurally-oriented law.)o Among other things, the
amendment provided that the federal court to which a defendant had removed a civil
action "is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil action
because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not have
jurisdiction over that claim."" As a procedure-remaking statute, this amendment was
similar in scope to the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, which
followed shortly in 1988.12 The 1988 amendment expressly provided that "the
citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded" for
purposes of the federal court's removal jurisdiction. 3 Significantly, this procedural
correction-indeed, all the technical improvements in the 1988 amendmentaccompanied a larger program of judicial study and streamlining of the federal courts
implemented by the same legislation.14

6.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7.
Id. § 6, 90 Stat. at 2898.
8.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
9.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 6, 90 Stat. at 2928 (emphasis
added).
10.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
11.
Id § 3(a), 100 Stat. at 637.
12.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
13. Id. § 1016, 102 Stat. at 4669-70.
14. Id. § 102(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 4644 (noting that one of the purposes behind the
Federal Courts Study Act, or title I of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
is to "develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary," which includes
assessments involving "alternative methods of dispute resolution;" "the structure and
administration of the Federal court system;" "methods of resolving intracircuit and
intercircuit conflicts in the courts of appeals;" and "the types of disputes resolved by the
Federal courts"). Of particular note to the present discussion are "the structure and
administration of the Federal court system" and "the types of disputes resolved by the
Federal courts." Id. § 102(b)(2)(B), (D), 102 Stat. at 4644.
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The investigation prompted by the 1988 amendment gave way to the findings of
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.1 These findings identified cost and delay as
significant problems attending federal litigation 16 and articulated their adverse effect
on merits adjudication of disputes and access to the courts.17 The findings also
proposed a framework of solutions.'8 The solutions set forth by Congress notably
included "the differential treatment of cases that provides for individualized and
specific management according to their needs, complexity, duration, and probable
litigation careers ...."9 This general congressional preference for fact-specific
procedures would translate, among other things, into more nuanced removal rules.
As to the removal statutes themselves, the 1990 amendment continued the
growing congressional trend of more finely tailoring the scope of removal jurisdiction
in two ways. First, the amendment treated "separate and independent [anchor]
claim[s] or cause[s] of action ... joined with ... otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action."20 The removability of such combined claims had previously
required anchor claims "which would be removable if sued upon alone."21 Such
claims included both federal question cases and diversity cases.22 The 1990
amendment narrowed this criterion to make such combined claims removable only
where the anchor claim fell "within the jurisdiction conferred by [28 U.S.C. §] 1331,"
i.e., federal question cases.2 3
Second, the amendment addressed the discretion of the federal district court to
remand, or not, the matters within its jurisdiction.24 The fate of such combined
claims had previously been for the federal courts to "remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction."25 The 1990 amendment changed the contour of the
courts' apparent discretion to remand or retain, providing that courts "remand all
matters in which State law predominates.'as By negative implication, then, the
amendment guided the federal courts' discretion to retain some matters not otherwise
within their original jurisdiction in which state law did not predominate.

15. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
16. Id. § 102(1), 104 Stat. at 5089.
17. Id. § 102(2), 104 Stat. at 5089.
18. Id. § 102(5), 104 Stat. at 5089-90.
19. Id. § 102(5)(A), 104 Stat. at 5089.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006).
21.
Id. § 1441 note (1990 Amendments).
22. Id. § 1441(c).
23.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 312, 104 Stat. at 5114.
24. Id.
25.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
26.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 312, 104 Stat. at 5114.
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Removal jurisdiction after the 1990 amendment has remained substantially
unchanged 2 7 to the present day. Indeed, much of the case law discussed here arose in
light of this language.
B. The Problem ofLocal Prejudice

The cumulative effect of congressional amendments from 1976 onward has been
to tailor the scope of removal jurisdiction more finely, whether with regard to subject
matter,28 procedural origin,29 fraudulent litigant conduct,30 or remand discretion.
Regardless of whether Congress, in a particular instance, contracted the scope of
removal jurisdiction or expanded it, it was plain that Congress had affirmatively
acted. The number and variety of amendments to federal removal jurisdiction
undertaken by Congress demonstrates its interest in shaping and reshaping the
contours of that jurisdiction.
The substance of these amendments, even as they affect removal, has been
broader than merely the question of local prejudice. For example, the findings set
forth in the 1990 amendment spoke generally of concerns such as cost and delay.32
Similarly, the program ofjudicial study contemplated by the 1988 amendment looked
largely to "the structure and administration of the Federal court system" and "the
types of disputes resolved by the Federal courts . .. ."3 Whereas the relevance of
local prejudice was historically a self-evidently motivating concern for removal
jurisdiction, at least one study indicates that local prejudice is no longer a sole
concern for parties seeking removal.34

A clerical amendment came in 1991 to correct a scrivener's error previously
27.
introduced by the 1990 amendment. Act of Dec. 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 4, 105 Stat.
1623, 1623 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006)).
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
28.
2891; supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633
29.
(1986); supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
30. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988); supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089; supra notes 15-19 and
31.
accompanying text.
32.
See id. § 102(1), 104 Stat. at 4669.
33.
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 102(b)(2)(B), (D), 102
Stat. at 4644.
34. See, e.g., Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. REv. 933, 935-38 (1962) (stating that additional
factors for selecting federal courts include, among other things, geographical convenience,
more lenient discovery procedures, higher jury verdicts, and clients' preference).
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II. GAMESMANSHIP: CIRCUMVENTING THE FORUM-STATE EXCEPTION
While the empirical data is equivocal as to motivation, the case law is clear as to
the effect of the language of the removal statute.35 The operative statutory language
regarding the forum-state exception holds that any action removed on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction36 "shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properlyjoinedandserved as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action

is brought."37 The following is an analysis of the factual dilemmas posed by the
statutory language and the interpretive approaches that courts have brought to bear in
response.
A. The New Jersey Experience

The most compelling trend of procedural gamesmanship in removal comes from
New Jersey. In Frickv. Novartis PharmaceuticalsCorp.,38 plaintiff filed suit in New
Jersey Superior Court on October 31, 2005.39 Plaintiff advanced a personal injury
claim, alleging injuries she sustained from ingesting prescription medication
manufactured by defendants.40 Though plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania,
defendant Novartis was a citizen of New Jersey,4 1 having its principal place of
business there. Before the plaintiff had served any defendants, Novartis removed the
case on November 15, 2005, to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey,
asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.42 Plaintiff moved to remand,
arguing improvident removal.43 The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand.44
Similarly, in Thomson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals,Corp., 45 plaintiffs filed suit

in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County on December 19, 2006.46
Plaintiffs advanced eight claims, all govemed by state law.47 Though plaintiffs were
35.

The acceptability of that effect in individual cases is the subject of considerable

dispute. See, e.g., Fields v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922 (SRC), 2007 WL 4365312, at
*4-5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007) (discussing differences between statutory language and
legislative intent); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
37. Id § 1441(b) (emphasis added).
38. No. 05-5429(DRD), 2006 WL 454360 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006).

39.

Id. at *1.

40.

Id.

41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.

44.

Id. at *3.

45. No. 06-6280 (JBS), 2007 WL 1521138 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007).
46. Id. at *1.
47. Id. The plaintiffs made the following claims: (1) products liability-failure to
warn; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act;
(4) breach of implied warranty; (5) products liability-defective design; (6) punitive damages

2011/12]

PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL

153

citizens of Georgia, defendant Novartis was a citizen of New Jersey, having its
principal place of business there.4 8 Yet on December 9, 2006, prior to being served
with process, Novartis removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey, asserting both a federal question under § 133 149 and diversity under
§ 1332. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing improvident removal. 50 The court
denied the plaintiff's motion to remand on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction and so
never reached the issue of federal question jurisdiction.5 1
In Thonon, as in Frick, the court reasoned that the plain language of the
removal statute required Novartis to have been "joined and served" in order for it to
be considered a forum-state defendant that would defeat removal.52 Because
Novartis had removed the case prior to service, the removal was presumptively
valid.s3 The court looked next to Thomson's argument that the purpose of the "joined
and served" requirement is to prevent plaintiffs from joining forum-state parties
specifically to defeat removal.54 Because the requirement is meant to disincentivize
plaintiffs from joining parties they do not intend to serve, Thomson argued, the
requirement cannot take effect until at least one party has been served.55 As a matter
of policy, Thomson argued further that large corporate defendants, such as Novartis,
may easily monitor dockets and immediately remove cases prior to service where
grounds exist for diversity jurisdiction.56
At the time, New Jersey law included a procedural idiosyncrasy which
ostensibly strengthened Thomson's policy argument: In cases brought before New
Jersey courts, plaintiffs must obtain a "track assignment number" prior to serving the
complaint.57 Inasmuch as this track assignment number may take as long as ten days
to receive, an aggressively watchful defendant potentially enjoys a window of time
during which it may remove the case.
To this, Thomson added that he had made "numerous attempts to serve"
Novartis and had even visited Novartis's office on December 29, 2006, only to be
told that no one was available to accept service until January 2, 2007.51 In this
regard, however, the court reasoned that the absence of personnel to accept service on
under common law; (7) wrongful death; and (8) a survival action. Id.
48.
Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *1.
49. Id. at *2. The defendant's § 1331 argument alleged federal preemption of
plaintiffs' claims by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id
50.
Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *2.
51.
Id. at *4.
52.
Id
Id.
53.
54.
Id. at *3.
55.
Id.
56. Id. at *3 n.4.
57. Id.
58.
Id
59.
Id at *3.
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behalf of Novartis was to be expected given the holiday season, and there was no
evidence to support the charge that Novartis had evaded service.60
As to the underlying point of statutory construction, the court further reasoned
that the guiding precedent 6 1 obliged the court to give meaning to the plain language
of the statute. 62 The court held that institutional respect for the will of Congress
superseded the admittedly colorable policy arguments advanced by Thomson. 6 3
Indeed, a plaintiff concerned about a corporate forum-state defendant avoiding
process in order to remove under cover of the "joined and served" requirement could
just as easily serve the designated corporate agent in the state, "as permitted by N.J.
Court Rules, R. 4:44(a)(6)."64
Frick, by contrast, was more straightforward in its application of the plainlanguage rule. Distinguishing the facts at bar from Recognition Communications,
Inc. v American Automobile Ass'n and Holmstrom v. Harad," the court in Frick

noted that Novartis was the only named defendant and so did not require the consent
of any other co-defendants. 67 The court also rejected a reading of Holmstrom
requiring that a defendant could invoke the "properly joined and served" requirement
only after the plaintiff had served at least one defendant.68 Though the argument was
plausible, said the court, it simply "does not adhere to the literal language of the
statute."69
Both Frick and Thomson are notable for the symmetry of the litigants'
arguments. In each case, the plaintiff seeking remand asserted that the "joined and
served" requirement takes effect only after one or more parties have been served, so
that allowing pre-service removal would "essentially remove the 'joined and served'
requirement from 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)."70 Defendant Novartis similarly argued that
the "joined and served" requirement exists to prevent tactical joinder of a forum-state
party and that denying pre-service removal would "read the words 'and served' out of
the statute." 7' In other words, plaintiff's interpretation would allow a party to join a

Id. at *4.
The Court adopted the reasoning of Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir.
61.
2003), and Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180-81
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). See Thompson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *3-4.
Thompson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *4.
62.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *4 n.5.
65. No. 3:97-CV-0945-P, 1998 WL 119528 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998).
66. No. 05 C 2714, 2005 WL 1950672 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005).
67. Frick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 05-5429(DRD), 2006 WL 454360, at *2
(D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006).
68. Id.
60.

69.

id.

Thomson v. Novartis Pharm., Corp., No. 06-6280 (JBS), 2007 WL 1521138, at
70.
*3 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007).
Id at *4.
71.

PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL
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forum-state defendant with no intention of service, solely for the purpose of defeating
removal.
This analytic tension has played itself out through two competing lines of
jurisprudence pitting process against outcome as to whether the plain language of
§ 1441(b) is the end of the inquiry.
B. Process vs. Outcome: Competing Threads ofJurisprudence

Shortly after Thomson, the court in Ripley v. Eon Labs Inc.72 faced the question
of pre-service removal in the slightly distinct context of multiple defendants. In that
case, plaintiff Ripley was a citizen of California and sued defendants Eon Labs,
Sandoz, and Novartis in New Jersey state court.73 Eon Labs was a citizen of New
York, Sandoz and Novartis were both citizens of New Jersey.74 Sandoz removed the
case prior to service, asserting complete diversity.7 5 The court held, as in Thomson,
that the plain language of the statute prevailed over policy arguments to the
contrary.76 In this, the court also noted that, similar to Thompson, none of the parties
had yet been served.77
By contrast, the court in Fields v Organon USA Inc.78 reached the opposite
conclusion. In that case, plaintiff Fields was a citizen of California and sued
defendant Organon and its affiliates in New Jersey state court.79 Organon, a
subsidiary of a named foreign defendant corporation, was a citizen of New Jersey,
having its principal place of business there.so The court reasoned that the purpose of
the forum-defendant rule was to "avoid possible prejudice to an out-of-state
defendant."8 1 Yet there is no need for such precaution "in cases where the defendant
is a citizen of the state in which the case is brought." 82 Accordingly, the court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the action and remanded the case.
72.
73.
74.
75.

622 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.N.J. 2007).
Id at 139.
Id.
Id. at 139-40. Sandoz asserted that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the parties were

completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory requirement. Id
76.
77.
78.

Ripley, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
Id.
No. 07-2922 (SRC), 2007 WL 4365312 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007).

79.

Id. at * 1.

80. Id.
81.
Id. at *3 (citing S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102). The Senate Report explains, in relevant part, that "[t]he
underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship legislation . . . is to provide a separate forum
for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making
available to them the benefits and safeguards of the federal courts." S. REP. No. 85-1830.
82. Fields, 2007 WL 4365312, at *3 (quoting Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456
F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006)).
83. Id. at *9.
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Recognizing and reiterating the symmetric arguments advanced in Thomson, the
court concluded that "[r]emoval under such circumstances does not comport with the
policy underlying the statutes providing for removal based upon diversity jurisdiction
and frustrates the policy underlying the forum-defendant rule." 84 The court duly
acknowledged that the plain language of the removal statute did "appear to imply that
a forum defendant may remove an action as long as it does so before being served.'8 5
Nevertheless, the court said, "such a bizarre result cannot possibly have been the
intent of the legislature." 86 Accordingly, the court granted the petition for remand
back to the state court.87
C. Appellate Silence

The history of removal jurisdiction may also be understood by reference to its
complementary procedural device-the remand order. In its present form, the
remand statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), provides as follows:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.88
Moreover, § 1447(d) imposes a further restriction: Orders to remand under
§ 1447(c) are "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise...."89 Section 1447(d)'s
restriction does exclude civil rights cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, but, in
general, the statute denies appellate review of orders to remand.90
For their part, courts have historically respected this statutory enumeration of
criteria both for removal and for remand. When Congress began in 1976 to reshape
the contours of removal jurisdiction, the remand statute read as follows:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case,
and may order the payment ofjust costs.9'

84.
85.

Id. at *4.
Id

86.

Id.

87.

88.
89.
90.

91.

Id, at *9.

.28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
Id. § 1447(d).
Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).
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Courts at the time construed improvident removal to describe removals whose
defects implicated congressionally prescribed statutory conditions of removal.92 By
contrast, removal and remand based on common law "doctrines such as forum non
conveniens, abstention or supplemental jurisdiction were held to be outside of

§ 1447(d)'s prohibition because they were not tied to the statutory criteriafor
removal."93

This distinction between statutory and common law grounds for removal
demonstrates a historical respect by courts for the sanctity of statutory removal
criteria. The distinction is particularly important in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Thermtron Products,Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,94 holding that the § 1447(d)
bar on appellate review only applies to remand orders properly entered pursuant to
the statutory remand criteria of § 1447(c).95
The plaintiffs in Thermtron filed an action in Kentucky state court against
Thermtron, an Indiana corporation, who then removed to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky."9 The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion
to remand the case to state court due, in part, to the federal courts' crowded civil
docket, stating that "an adjudication of the merits of the case would be expedited in
the state court."97 The motion was granted despite the plaintiffs' insufficient showing
of prejudice in state court.98 Thermtron appealed the remand order, arguing that none
of these grounds were tied to the § 1447(c) criteria for remand and that § 1447(d) did
not bar appellate review of remand orders unauthorized by § 1447(c).99
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied review on the grounds
"that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the order for remand" and "that [it]
had no jurisdiction to review [the] order ... because of the prohibition against
appellate review contained in § 1447(d).",oo The unreversed decision of the District
Court specifically highlighted the risk of local prejudice to defendants, the initial right
of plaintiffs to choose the forum, and the desirability of timely adjudication,
themes historically associated with shaping removal doctrine.
The Supreme Court ultimately accepted Thermtron's argument and held that
§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c). 02 Accordingly, while
92. See, e.g., Holmstrom v. Peterson, 492 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007).
93.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
94. 423 U.S. 336 (1976), abrogatedon other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
95. Id. at 351.
96. Id. at 336-38.
97. Id. at 339.
98.
Id. at 341.
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id. at 341-42.
101. Id. at 340-41.
102. Id. at 345-46 (quoting Emp'rs Reins. Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 380 (1937));
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§ 1447(d) purports to foreclose review of virtually all remand orders, Thermtron
narrowed the review prohibition to only those remand orders based on § 1447(c)
grounds-"(1) any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction [or] (2) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction"' 03-and attached the respective remand time limit of

§ 1447(d) accordingly.104
In this context, the forum-state exception must be understood as an example of a
procedural defect subject to the thirty-day remand time limit, not a defect based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The inaction of a plaintiff, therefore, may waive
his or her right to seek remand, just as the inaction of a plaintiff in serving the
defendant may produce the tactical removal in the first instance.
It is significant that the forum-state exception is of a procedural nature, for this
procedural character has important implications for subsequent appeals taken by the
plaintiff. The U.S. Courts of Appeal are not merely silent on the legitimacy of preservice removal: some have expressly declined to consider the merits of the question.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to consider
the merits regarding the legitimacy of pre-service removal in Holmstrom v.
Peterson.0 5 The removing defendant Peterson was an Ohio citizen sued by the
plaintiff Holmstrom, a New Jersey citizen.' 06 Though the complaint also named an
Illinois citizen as a defendant, Holmstrom had not yet served that forum defendant
when Peterson removed.10 7 The District Court granted Holmstrom's subsequent
motion to remand and Peterson appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by
countermanding the plain language of the statute. 08
Quite apart from the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals held that the
§ 1447(d) bar to appellate jurisdiction arises from remand orders upon removals
under § 1441(b).109 The court rejected Peterson's argument that the District Court
was not applying § 1441(b) itself, but rather "a judicially crafted exception to it." 0
The Court ofAppeals concluded that a removal premised on the "properly joined and
served" language of § 1441(b) is not a judicial exception, but merely an interpretation

see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in pari materia as a canon
of statutory construction whereby two or more statutes are "construed together, so that
inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same
subject").
103. Holmstrom v. Peterson, 492 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing
Thermtron's application of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
104. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 346.
105. Holmstrom, 492 F.3d at 834-36 (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the
court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review a federal trial order remanding a case originally
removed from Illinois state court under the forum-state exception).

106. Id. at 834.
107. Id. at 834-35.
108. Id. at 835.

109. Id. at 839.
110. Id.
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of the rule."' Accordingly, "failure to comply with the forum-defendant rule set forth
in § 1441(b) is a 'defect other than subject matter jurisdiction,' as that term has come
to be understood, subject to the review prohibition of § 1447(d)."I 12 Thus, appellate
review of the order to remand was not available. 1 3

M. ANALYTic SENSE: THE MOVING PARTS OF REMOVAL
This section attempts to reconcile the body of district court opinions with respect
to three doctrinal dimensions of removal: the number of relevant defendants; any
successful service of process upon defendants; and agreement among defendants as
to removal. It also proposes a hierarchy of these criteria, whereby courts may reach a
nuanced, but theoretically consistent, conclusion with regard to the procedural
postures of removal.
The lone removant presents the simplest case of pre-service removal since such a
litigant bears the sole tactical responsibility for the removal. Allowing a lone
removant the victory of pre-service removal is the broadest possible pronouncement
about the legitimacy of the tactic. Denying the removant pre-service removal,
however, does not foreclose a more nuanced approach to complicated cases.
The historical pattern of specific congressional amendments to the language of
the removal statute from 1976 onward counters the reasoning of Fields 14 and similar
cases holding that the procedural gamesmanship of pre-service removal is a bizarre
outcome that could not have been contemplated by Congress. To the contrary, the
active role Congress has taken in shaping removal jurisdiction, specifically, the
number and variety of amendments to the removal statute, evinces congressional
awareness that even small adjustments to the statutory language of removal create
significant consequences in litigation. The nature of these amendments bears
recalling: congressional changes have embraced the subject matter,' 15 procedural
origin,l1 fraudulent litigant conduct,' and remand discretion"' attending the
removal statute.

111.

Id.

112. Id. at 838.
113.
114.

Id. (citing Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641 (2006)).

Fields v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922 (SRC), 2007 WL 4365312 (D.N.J.
Dec. 12, 2007); supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
115. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 6, 90 Stat.
2891, 2898 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006)).
116. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3(a), 100 Stat.
633, 637 (1986) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) (2006)).
117. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (2006)).
118. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102, 104 Stat.
5089, 5089-90 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (2006)).
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By contrast, the court in Fields relied in part on the logic of an earlier case, Stan
Winston Creatures, Inc. v Toys "R" Us, Inc.,l 19 wherein the court opined that the

presence of complete diversity among the parties determined whether service
defeated removal for purposes of the "joined and served" requirement of
§ 1441(b).120 That is, "where ... [complete] diversity does exist between the parties,
an unserved resident defendant may be ignored in determining removability ....
In contrast are those cases in which "'the presence of a defendant who is a citizen of
the same state as the plaintiff" would defeat complete diversity in the first
instance.122 In these latter situations, Winston required considering the citizenship of
all named defendants, "'whether served with process or not,"' to determine as a
necessary precondition to removability whether diversity exists.' 23
The Winston approach, however, is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
It allows courts to condition pre-service removal by a forum-state removant among
multiple defendants only where all are completely diverse with respect to the
plaintiffs, regardless of service.124 In other words, a removant who is not a citizen of
the forum state is unable to engage in pre-service removal where any other defendant,
even an unserved one, would defeat complete diversity. This interpretation would, in
effect, write the "properly joined and served" language out of§ 1441(b).125
Specific issues also arise with respect to agreement among parties and service
upon particular defendants. In the case of a nonforum removant tied to forum-state
co-defendants, there is no countervailing consideration against the court's need to
give meaning to the plain language of § 1441(b).12 Yet where a forum removant
attempts pre-service removal on the strength of nonforum removants by virtue of
their diversity, a subordinate question arises: which parties have been served?
Here, if the forum defendant has been served, then the court should deny
removal even though nonforum defendants remain unserved. Indeed, this is the
trivial case where the removal is not even pre-service with respect to defendants
"properly joined and served" under § 1441(b). Yet the difficult case arises where the
forum defendant has not been served and nonforum defendants have. This turns the
underlying risk of local prejudice on its head. In such a case, the historically
expressed intent of Congress must prevail and the removal allowed to stand.

119. 314 F. Supp. 2d 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120. Id. at 180-81.
121. Id. at 180 (alteration in original) (quoting Ott v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of
Del., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (S.D. Miss. 2002)).
122. Id. at 181 (quoting Ott, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 663).
123. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ott, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 664).
124. Id. at 179-80.
125. See Thomson v. Novartis Pharms., Corp., No. 06-6280 (JBS), 2007 WL
1521138, at *4 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007).
126. See id.
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EPiLOGUE: CURRENT LEGISLATION

The essential argument of this article has been that, notwithstanding charges of
procedural gamesmanship, pre-service removal is a legitimate litigation strategy
within both the language of § 1441(b) and the historical trajectory of the removal
statute. To this, one final point bears mention with regard to the currently proposed

Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011. 127
Among the provisions of the 2011 Act are a series of amendments to the
substantive conditions as well as the procedures of removal and remand.128
Significantly, the amendments to diversity-based removal under § 1441(b) are largely
cosmetic. For example, one change preserves the immateriality to removal of "the
citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names," 29 merely striking the text
from the end of § 1441(a)130 and reinserting it at a newly created subsection (b)(1).131
Yet the enabling language of pre-service removal is, if anything, even more
hospitable to the strategy under the 2011 Act. The current languageAny other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is broughtl 32
-is

proposed to become the following:
A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction
under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought. 33

The same amendment also removes the first sentence of § 144 1(b):
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the

127. H.R. 394, 112th Cong. (2011) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 1,
2011). The U.S. House of Representatives passed this bill on February 28, 2011. Bill
Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dll2:1:./temp/bdlyqw:@@@R|/home/LegislativeData.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
128. H.R. 394 § 103.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (appearing in the final sentence of subsection (a)).

130. H.R. 394 § 103(a)(2)(B).
131. Id. sec. 103(a)(3), § 1441(b)(1).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (appearing in the final sentence of subsection (b)).
133. H.R. 394 sec. 103(a)(3), § 1441(b)(2).
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United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence
of the parties.134
To the extent that the 2011 Act modifies diversity removal under § 1441(b), these
modifications are "intended to make it easier for litigants to locate the provisions that
apply uniquely to diversity removal." 35 Yet as for the "properly joined and served"
language which enables pre-service removal, not only does it remain in the amended
statute, but is also refrained in a form more amenable to pre-service removal.
Though the first sentence of § 1441 makes cases presumptively removable136
where federal courts have original jurisdiction, theforn of the forum-state exception
is that of a condition precedent137 to removability. Even this formalistic "only if'
conception falls away under the 2011 Act, under which a diversity-only case
henceforth "may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants"1 is a citizen of the forum state.
The substance of the exception, for its part, remains intact. Indeed, Congress
itself recognized that the "[p]roposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) restates the substance of
the last sentence of current subsection 1441(b), which relates only to diversity."l 39 in
complement to this view of diversity removal as a separate issue warranting a
separate subsection, the 2011 Act also limits its codification of the "rule of
unanimity" regarding multiple defendants to cases involving federal question
removals. 14 0 Pre-service removal under § 1441(b) is, therefore, at most a doctrine
distinct to diversity jurisdiction, but far from a bizarre outcome, let alone one contrary
to the intent of Congress.
The 2011 Act also responds to specific recent bodies of removal case law while
leaving pre-service removal intact. The joint removability of federal and state law
claims, 14 1 for example, has come under fire both from judicial opinionsl42 and from
scholars1 43 finding the provision unconstitutional for granting a federal court
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (appearing in the first sentence of subsection (b)).
135. H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 12 (2011) (discussing the effect of "Proposed
Amendments to Section 1441").
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (beginning with the default, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly
provided by Act of Congress .... ).
137. Id. § 1441(b) (adding the proviso, "shall be removable only if .....
138. H.R. 394 sec. 103(a)(3), § 1441(b)(2).
139. H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 12 (discussing the effect of "Proposed Amendments to
Section 1441").
140. Id. at 13 ("Under [the rule of unanimity] . .. all defendants who have been
properly joined and served must join in or consent to removal. Like current law, the new
provision is limited to cases removed solely under section 1441(a); it has no application to
other statutes under which removal is authorized.").
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
142. See, e.g., Salei v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 913 F. Supp. 993, 1009, 1014 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
143. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, The UnconstitutionalStub of Section 1441(c),
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discretion to retain "separate and independent"'" state law claims over which the
court would have no original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 2011 Act takes a "severand-remand approach [that] is intended to cure any constitutional problems while
preserving the defendant's right to remove claims arising under Federal law."1 45
As to diversity removal in particular, the current limitation of removal to one
year from the filing datel 46 has been the subject of plaintiffs' own removal-defeating
gamesmanship. Thus far, such tactics have survived on the view that the one-year
time limit on removal is jurisdictional rather than procedural, a view similarly having
support both from judicial opinionsl47 and from scholars. 14 In light of ambiguous
Supreme Court guidance on the matter,14 9 the 2011 Act limitedly authorizes removal
has acted in bad faith
even beyond one year from the filing date where "the plaintiff
0
action."5
the
removing
from
defendant
a
prevent
to
in order
Faced in these cases with conflicting judicial interpretations of statutory text,
Congress is acting to amend the removal statute accordingly Yet despite the
conflicting jurisprudence surrounding pre-service removal and the structural barriers
impeding a proper circuit split, Congress does not appear to believe that the fault lies
with the text of § 1441(b).
CONCLUSION

Future congressional enactments will continue to find the forum-defendant rule
peculiarly susceptible to analytic shifts, as the rule's application is one of multiple
criteria. The approach described in this article is advanced with the understanding
that an all-inclusive procedural regime is ultimately the purview of Congress. To the
extent, therefore, that Congress has turned out a removal statute describing the
contours of jurisdiction rather than a comprehensive codification of fact scenarios, it
remains incumbent on courts to balance procedural integrity with substantive
fairness, and institutional consistency with judicial economy. Courts, however, should
do so in light of the demonstrated intent of Congress.
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1059-61 (1993) (exploring the unconstitutionality of "[s]eparate
claim removal jurisdiction for federal question cases").
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
145. H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 12 (discussing the "Joinder of Federal law claims and
state law claims").
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
147. See, e.g., Pecherski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 636 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1981).
148. See, e.g., Brian W. Portugal, Comment, More than a Legal Nicety: Why the
Forum Defendant Rule of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(b) Is Jurisdictional,56 BAYLOR L. REv.
1019 (2004).
149. See H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 15 (discussing ambiguity in the case law
surrounding equitable tolling of a procedural, rather than jurisdictional, limit on the ability of
federal courts to accept removals more than one year after the filing date).
150. H.R. 394, 112th Cong. sec. 103(b)(3)(C), § 1446(c)(1) (2011).

